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RECENT CASES
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-PART PAYMENT-BY CHECK.-ROACH V.
WARREN, NEELY & Co., 44 So. (ALA.) IO3.-Held, that where defendant was
indebted to plaintiff, and sent him a check for part of the amount, plaintiff
in collecting the check, was not bound to accept it in full of account, though
the check so stated.
With but one exception, it is settled law in the United States, that when
a debt is liquidated and due, in the absence of a release under seal, payment
of a less sum is not a satisfaction, Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham,
14 U. S. 564, the agreement being void for want of consideration. Curran v.
Rumnzell, 11S Mass. 482; contra, Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499, overruling
Surru:s v. Gordon, 57 Miss. 93. But when a claim is unliquidated. payment
and acceptance of a less sum given in satisfaction operates as accord and
satisfaction. Brockley v. Brockley, 122 Pa. I. In such case. the concession
made by one is a good consideration for the concession made by the other.
Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326. Accordingly, by weight of authority,
when a claim is in dispute and debtor sends a check for less sum "in full
payment" the retention thereof constitutes an accord and satisfaction.
Ostrander v. Scott, 161 Ill. 329; Hull v. Johnson, 22 R. S. 66. But in Day
v. McLea, 58 L. J. 2 B. 293, it is held that the mere retention of check is not
conclusive. To the same effect is Tompkins v. Hill, 145 Mass. .379. Arid
where a party receives a check for amount claimed by debtor to be due, and
sends debtor a protest, it is declared to be a question for the jury whether
there is an accord and satisfaction. Robinson v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 84
Mich. 658.
CARRIERS-EJECTION OF PASSENGER-AcrIoN-DAMAGES-HuMILIATION.-
BRENNER V. JONESBORO, L. C. & E. RY. Co.-ioo S. W. (ARK.) 893.-Held,
that it was proper not to submit to the jury the issue of humiliation, in an
action for the ejection of a passenger from the train, who had been unable
to purchase a ticket from station-agent on account of the agent's negligence,
in which he testified that he was willing to get off if the conductor
refused to accept the regular fare, but that he intended to make the conductor
put him off, in order that he might bring an action.
A person wrongfully ejected from a train may recover for humiliation
and injury to his wounded feelings. Chicago, St. Louis, & Pittsburgh Ry.
Co. v. Holdridge, I18 Ind. 281; Harding v. L. E. &T W. Ry. Co., 36 Hun.
(N. Y.) 72. It is unlawful to expel a passenger, who has been unable to
purchase a ticket on account of the office not being open long enough prior
to the arrival of the train, when the conductor is offered the regular fare.
Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364. But where a party enters a
train, in expectation of being put off, in order to institute a suit for. dam-
ages, for humiliation, and is put off without necessary violence, he has no
cause of action. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Trimble, 54 Ark.
354-
CARRIER-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-EFFECT.-BATES V. WEIR, IO5 N. Y.
SuP. 785.-Held, that where a contract for the shipment of goods by express
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limits the carrier's liability to $5o unless a greater value is stated by the
shipper, in which case a higher rate is charged, the shipper is estopped from
asserting that the goods are worth more than the sum stated. Hirschberg.
P. J., and Rich, J., dissenting.
It is the rule that any contract by which a common carrier seeks to
exempt itself from all liability for loss arising from its own negligence is
void as against public policy. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S.
133; South & North Alabama R. Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 6o6; contra, Cragin
v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 6I. And so is any attempt to fix an arbitrary
limitation of value. Ruppel v. Allegheny Valley R. Co., 167 Pa. 166; Gal-
vcston, etc., R. Co. v. Ball, 8o Tex. 6o2. But the weight of authority sus-
tains an agreed valuation. Hill v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 144 Mass. 284;
Alan v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 53 Minn. i6o; contra, Southern Express Co.
v. Moon, 39 Miss. 822. The limitation to an agreed value rests upon the
doctrine of estoppel. Hart v. Pa. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331. And where the
shipper, to avoid payment of increased charges, fraudulently conceals. real
value, he is estopped by his own conduct. Magnin v. Dinsmore. 62 N. Y. 35.
On the same principle it is generally held that a stipulation limiting liability
to a certain sum unless shipper discloses value in excess is valid in case of
loss by negligence. Durgin v. American Express Co., 66 N. H. 277; Oppen-
heimer v. U. S. Express Co., 69 Ill. 62; contra, Conover v. Pacific Express
Co., 40 Mo. App. 31. Nor is it the duty of the carrier to make inquiry as to
value. Kallman v. U. S. Express Co., 3 Kan. 205. But if real value was
known to carrier to be in excess of stipulated amount he will be liable for
negligence. Van Winkle vs Adams Express Co., 3 Rob. (N. Y.) 59.
CARRIERS-P.ERSONAL INJURIEs-LIMITATION oF LIABILITY.-CLEVELAND,
C. C. & ST. L. Ry. Co. v. HENRY, 8o N. E. 636 (IND.).-Held, that common
carriers of passengers are not permitted to contract against liability on
account of their own negligence.
This broad common law rule obtains generally on the grounds of public
policy. Cooley on Torts [3d Ed.] 1477. Contracts exempting the carrier
or his servants from responsibility are void as attempting to put off the
essential duties of the carrier. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Solon, 169 U. S.
133. The English law is affected by statute which leaves the court to deter-
mining the reasonableness of exemptions in carriers' contracts; but the courts
hold exemptions from liability for negligence in the transportation of goods
unreasonable. Peek v. N. Stafford R. Co., IO H. L. Cas. 473. They, how-
ever, hold that carriers of passengers may stipulate in passes to drovers that
the carrier shall not be responsible for any risks. McCawley v. Furness,
L. R., 8 Q. B. 57. But the weight of authority in this country makes no
exception to drovers' contracts. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Beebe, 174 Il.
13; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; contra, Bissell v. N. Y. Cent.
R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 442. But it is otherwise as to strictly free passes;
Kinney v. Central R. R. Co., 34 N. J. 513; Ulrich v. New York Central, etc.,
R. R. Co., io8 N. Y. 8o; Quimby v. Bosson, etc., R. R. Co., 15o Mass. 365;
contra, Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Butler, 57 Penn. St. 335; Ill. Cent. R. R.
Co. v. Read, 37 Ill. 484; Waterbury v. New York, etc., Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 671.
In Wisconsin such exemptions are valid unless recklessness or such careless-
ness as is made criminal by statute is present. Annas v. Milwaukee, etc., Co.,
67 Wis. 46. Exemptions for injuries to express messengers have been
declared good on ground of rights accorded in excess of those to which a
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passenger is entitled. Bates v. Old Colony R. Co., 147 Mass. 255; contra,
Voight v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 79 Fed. 56r. But void as to mail agents
for want of consideration. Seybolt v. New York, etc., R. Co., 95 N. Y. 562.
CARRIERs-STREET RAILROADs-Loss OF BAGGAGE-LIABILITY.-SPERRY V.
CONSOLIDATED Ry. Co., 65 Am. (CONN.) 962.-Held, that where a carrier
does not take full possession of the baggage of a passenger, but the same
remains under his control, the carrier, in the absence of a special agreement,
does not assume the carriers' liability of an insurer, but becomes responsible
only for failing to exercise reasonable care to protect the same from loss or
injury.
Carriers of passengers may become liable as bailee of passengers' bag-
gage the same as a common carrier of goods, Penn. R. R. Co. v. Knight, 58
N. J. L. 287; Dowd v. Albany R. Co., 47 N. Y. App. Div. 2o2; but the carriers'
liability is not that of an insurer, when passenger retains such baggage in his
possession, Kingsley v. Lake Shore R. Co., 125 Mass. 54; Steamship Co. v.
Bryan, 83 Penn. St. 446; Gleason v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 32 Wis. 85; his
duty in such case being to exercise reasonable care to protect such effects,
Greenfield First Nat. Bank v. Marietta R. Co., 2o Ohio St. 259; Henderson v.
Louisville R. Co., 123 U. S. 61. Although there are some English cases
upholding the same rule, Berghiern v. Great Eastern, 3 C. P. Div. 221; Great
Northern R. Co. v. Shepherd, 8 Exch. 30; they have been disapproved of in a
later case, which is recognized as prevailing, Great Western R. Co. v.
Burnet, L. R. 13 App. 47;' but the apparent conflict may be distinguished by
their peculiar methods of business in connection with carriage of baggage.
Le Conteur v. London, 6 B. & S. 967.
CARRIERS-STREET RAILWAYS-REFUSAL TO GIvE TRANSFER.-JOHNSTON
v. NEw YORK CITY Ry. Co., 104 N. Y. Sup. 812.-Held, that a street railway
is not liable for a refusal to give a transfer to one who becomes a passenger
solely to lay a foundation to sue for such refusal.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-PARTIES IN PARI DELICTO.-RIGHT OF ACTION.-
FALKENBERG v. ALLEN, 90 PAC. (OKLA.) 415.-Held, that where a number of
persons conspire together to perpetrate a confidence game and work a swin-
dle upon a victim by pretending to bet upon a foot race, and they induce the
victim to believe that the race is fixed, and that his money will only be used
to put up against those who bet upon the opposite side, and that the stake-
holder will return it to him as soon as the opposite betters put up their
money, when, in fact, the runners and all the others connected with the con-
spiracy intend that the victim shall lose his money, and the fake race is only
used and run to induce him to place his money in their possession so that
they can pretend that he lost his money, and thus cheat and swindle him,
held that, although he may be a victim in pari delicto with the other con-
spirators, he may recover from the so-called stakeholder where he denounces
the scheme and demands of the stakeholder his money before the race is run.
CONTRACrs-PuBLIC POLiCY-RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-UNITED SHOE MA-
CHINERY Co. v. KIMBALL, 79 N. E. 79o (MASS.) Where a bill of sale of
business, with the good-will thereof, stipulated that the seller would not for
a period of fifteen years directly or indirectly engage in a similar business,
more than half of the consideration being paid by the buyer for the good-
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will of the business or to obtain relief from the competition of the seller,
held, that the agreement was not void as against public policy.
Contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade are illegal; this is a very
old doctrine, a case being found in the Year Book, in which Mr. Justice Hall
lost his temper at the very sight of the bond and exclaimed with an oath that
if the plaintiff had been in court he should have gone to prison until he had
paid a fine. 2 Henry V., Term. Pash. pl. 26. A restraint upon trade, in
order to be good at law, must be partial, reasonable, and founded upon a
valuable consideration. Mitchell v. Reynolds, I P. Wins. 181; Gantewell
Fire Alarm Tel. Co. v. Crane, i6o Mass. 5o; Perls v. Saalfeld, [1892] 2 Ch.
149; Ryan v. Hamilton, 205 Ill. 191. Within the last few years a change has
taken place in the views expressed by judges as to the test of illegality in
contracts in restraint of trade: the true criterion is now said to be, not
whether the restraint is general or partial, but whether it is reasonable or
unreasonable. Equity is loath to enforce a contract in restraint of trade,
even although it be good at law, if the terms are hard or even complex.
Contracts in restraint of trade, however, if they are reasonable, and not
because of any circumstances of hardship under which they were executed,
will be enforced in equity. Bispam's Principles of Equity, Section 228. A
patentee and manufacturer of guns and ammunition covenanted with a com-
pany to which his patents and business had been transferred, not to engage,
for twenty-five years, in the business of manufacturing guns and ammuni-
tion, it was held that the contract was not in restraint of trade. Nordenfelt
v. Maxim-Nordenfelt [I9O4] App. Cas. 535.
CONTRACTS-SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE-TME OF PERFORMANCE.-NEW
JERSEY Co. v. NATHANIEL WISE CO., 105 N. Y. SuP. 232.-Held, that ..the
delivery of brick, under a contract providing that the brick should be deliv-
ered not later than a day named, on the day succeeding at 6:25 A. M. con-
stituted a substantial performance of the contract.
COVENANTS-DESTRUCTIVE COVENANTS.-PARTIES ENTITLED TO ENFORCE.-
KORN v. CAMPBELL, 1O4 N. Y. Supp. 462, where a party became the owner of
an entire tract of land subject to the covenant to use or suffer the said
premises to be used for the erection of first-class private residences only, he
was at liberty to deal with it as he saw fit, though the deed conveying a part
of it to one of his grantors contained a reference to this restrictive cove-
nant; and where he conveyed separate tracts of the same piece of property to
different persons, without attempting to impose any restrictions on the prop-
erty, held, that there are none that the owners can enforce between them-
selves.
A covenant in a deed of land restricting the mode of its use, and in-
serted for the benefit of adjoining land of the grantor, will be extinguished
by the subsequent vesting in one person of the title to both tracts of land.
Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361. And it is presumed that such a restriction was
inserted for the purpose of protecting rights which the grantor had in adja-
cent property. Post v. Weil, supra. At law, these restrictions, although
undoubtedly, where not opposed to public policy, are enforceable as con-
tracts between the immediate parties, Whitney v. Ry. Co., iI Gray (Mass.)
359, could not be enforced by or against assignees, unless created in such
form as to constitute covenants, or conditions, or easements. Langley v.
Chapin, 134 Mass. 82, Courts of equity, however, irrespective of whether a
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privity of estate exists, or whether the restrictions run with the land, or
whether they are easements, upon equitable grounds enforce such restric-
tions against purchasers with notice. Coudert v. Sayre, 46 N. .. Eq. 386.
This rule of equity being an encroachment on the general doctrine of the
common law, that the burden of a covenant does not run with the land,
Austerberry v. Oldhatn, 29 Ch. Div. 750, its application is not to be extended
beyond the class of cases in which a negative covenant has been expressed,
Hall V. Ewvin, 37 Ch. Div. 74. The equity thus enforced arises from the
inference that the covenant has, to a material extent, entered into the con-
sideration of the purchase, and that it would be unjust to the original grantor
to permit the covenant to be violated. Tulk v. Moxbay, 2 Phil. Ch. 774.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-ENFORCEMENT-ESTOPPEL.-CRAFTON V. PATRICK,
58 S. E. (S. C.).-After condition broken, held, the mortgagee is not
estopped to enforce his mortgage on a horse against one who has traded for
the horse from one other than the mortgagee, without notice of the mort-
gage, because he had seen the horse in possession of such other and heard
the horse had been traded several times and had taken no steps to give notice
of his mortgage other than to record it.
CORPORATIONS-KNoWLEDGE OF AGENTS-NOTICE.-E. S. WOODWORTH &
Co. iV. CARROLL, 112 N. W. 1054 (MINN.)-Held, a corporation is not charged
with notice of facts because of knowledge on the part of an officer or agent,
when the officer or agent is dealing with the corporation in his own inter-
est, or when, for any other reason, his interest is adverse to that of the cor-
poration, so that communication of the knowledge by him cannot be pre-
sumed.
A corporation will not be affected by notice which one of its directors
or other officers may have received when not acting for the corporation, but
in the transaction of his own private affairs, under such circumstances that
its communication is not to be expected, State Say. Ass'n v. Nixon-Jones
Printing Co., 25 Mo. App. 642; Miller v. Central R. Co., 24 Barb. 312. Where
an officer of a corporation, acting in his own behalf, conveys property to the
corporation, his knowledge of facts derogatory to the title conveyed does
not bind the corporation, Barnes v. Trenton Gaslight Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 33,
He, in making the sale and conveyance stands as a stranger to the com-
pany, Stratton v. Allen, I C. E. Green 229. But by the weight of authority,
when an officer of a corporation does an act which constitutes a fraud upon
a third person or upon another corporation, of which he is also an officer,
the first mentioned corporation is chargeable with the notice of -the nature
of the transaction, although the fraud is perpetrated for his own benefit
when he also represents the corporation in the transaction, Marshall On
Corporations, p. 98o; Detroit Motor Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank, iII Mich. 407.
CRIMINAL LAw-ExcEssvE SENTENCE-CoNvIcTION ON DIFFERENT
COUNTS-UNITED STATES V. PEEKE, 153 FED. i66.-Held, that where a defend-
ant has been convicted on different counts of an indictment charging sepa-
rate offenses under the same statute, the court may impose separate and
cumulative sentences upon the several counts, but a single sentence for a
term longer than is authorized by the statute for one offense is void as to
the excess, another court cannot cure the defect by apportioning the term
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on the different counts, and he will be discharged on habeas corpus after
serving the lawful part of the term.
Some courts deny the power to impose cumulative sentences. Bloom's
Case, 53 Mich. 597; Allen's Case, ii Ind. 389. They are allowed, however,
in Federal Courts if definite and certain. In re Esmond, 42 Fed. 827. A
cumulative sentence not exceeding in the aggregate the maximum term fixed
for a single offense, on a number of indictments, is, valid. Parker v. Peo,
4 L. R. A. 803 (Col.). Where one is sentenced for several distinct offenses
at the same time the record must recite each sentence separately. In re
McLaughlin, 58 Vt. 862. The prisoner will be released on habeas corpus
upon his serving his lawful term. In re Bulger, 6o Cal. 438. In State v.
Smith, 5 Day 175 (Conn.) the court apportioned the sentence, but this is con-
trary to the general rule.
CRIMINAL LAW.-CONTINUING CRIME PUNISHABLE IN EACH JURISDICTION
TO WHICH IT EXTENDs.-ARMOUR PACKING CO. v. UNITED STATES, 153 FED. I.
-Held, a continuing crime is a continuous unlawful act or series of acts set
on foot by a single impulse, and operated by an unintermittent force, how-
ever long it may occupy, and where such an act or series of acts runs through
several jurisdictions the offense is committed and cognizable in each.
Federal Courts have jurisdiction only of offenses committed within their
respective districts. U. S. v. Lee, 44 Fed. 707. In general, a criminal act is
punished in the place where that act occurs. U. S. v. Rundskopf, Fed. Cas.
No. 16, 165. So where an offense was committed in a railroad car passing
through a state, and it cannot be determined in what county the offense was
committed, it may be tried in any through which the train passed. Watt v.
People, 126 Ill. 9. Where a person, being beyond the limits of a state puts
in operation a force which produces a result and constitutes a crime in
another state, he is liable to indictment in the latter state if jurisdiction can
be obtained of his person.
DEEDS-CAPACITY TO ExEcuTE-NELsoN ET AL v. THOMPSON, 112 N. W.
io58 (N. D.). The test of whether a person is competent to make
a deed is that he should be qualified to do that particular business rationally
-not on the one hand, that he should be capable of doing all kinds of busi-
ness with judgment and discretion, nor, on the other, that he should be
wholly deprived of reason, so as to be incapable of doing the most familiar
and trifling work. Held, that the evidence in this case shows the grantor
in a deed to have been competent to execute the same. Morgan, J., dis-
senting.
To constitute such unsoundness of mind as should avoid a deed at law,
the person executing such deed must be incapable of understanding and act-
ing in the ordinary affairs of life, Edwards v. Davenport, 2o Fed. 756. To
establish incapacity in a grantor, he must be shown to have been at the time
the contract was made, non compos mentis, which means entirely without
understanding. Maddox v. Simmons, 31 Ga. 512. We have in this latter
case the extreme view of the matter. The prevailing rule is to the effect that
mere weakness of mind in the absence of fraud will not avoid his deed
unless it is of such a character as to amount virtually to insanity and to have
been the inducement of the deed. Malloy v. Ingalls, 4 Neb. 115. But imbe-
cility and eccentricity of mind is not the same, Adell v. Buck, 21 Wend. 142
(a leading case frequently cited).
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DIVORCE- GROUNDS- CRUELTY.- CAMPBELL V. CAMPBELL, 112 N. W.
481 (MicH.). The action of a wife in repeatedly and causelessly accus-
ing her husband in the presence of others with the offense of adultery is
extreme cruelty, warranting a divorce.
The causes for divorce must be great and weighty, and such as show an
absolute impossibility that the duties of the married life can be discharged.
What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted, where
they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere
rudeness of language, if it does not threaten bodily harm does not amotint to
legal cruelty. Evans v. Evans, (I79O), i; Hagg. Consist, 35, 4 Eng. Eccl. 31o.
It was formerly thought that to constitute extreme cruelty, such as would
authorize the granting of a divorce, physical violence.was necessary, but the
modern and better-considered cases have repudiated this doctrine as tak-
ing too low and sensual a view of the marriage relations and it is now very
generally held, that any justifiable conduct on the part of either, which
utterly dstroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, constitute
extreme cruelty, although no physical or personal violence may be inflicted, or
even threatened. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kan. 744; Avery v. Avery, 33
Kan. i. This case seems to give the general rule on this subject,
though some statutes provide that extreme cruelty is the infliction
of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering upon the other
by one party to the marriage, and whether in any given case there has been
inflicted this "grievous mental suffering" is a pure question of fact, to be
deduced from all the circumstances of each particular case, keeping in
mind the intelligence, apparent refinement and delicacy of sentiment of the
complaining party. Fleming v. Fleming, 95 Cal. 43o. Personal violence,
whether actual or threatened, or even gross or abusive language, is not abso-
lutely necessary to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment, Reinhard v. Rein-
hard, 96 Wisc. .555 A charge of adultery against the wife, made by the hus-
band, if malicious and without any probable cause, may constitute cruel and
inhuman treatment within the meaning of statute, granting divorce for cruel
and inhuman treatment, Wagner V. Wagner, 36 Minn. 239; Kennedy v. Ken-
nedy, 73 N. Y. 369. Texas courts refuse to give an action to the husband
for this cause, but give action to wife, if so charged. Jener v. Jener, 62
Texas 518; McAlister v. McAlister, 71 Texas 695.
DIVORCE-SEPARATION-WILFUL ABANDONMENT.-HEYMAN v. HEYMAN,
104 N. Y. SuPP. 227.-Held, that a single night's absence by a husband from
his home, which was furnished, in which his wife and child were being sup-
ported, and for which the rent was fully paid for a month, did not justify
the wife in leaving the home and commencing an action solely on the charge
of wilful abandonment.
The intention to abandon is the criterion and it may be gathered from
protracted absence and other facts. Ruckman v. Ruckman, 58 How. Pract.
278 (N. Y.). It must be the deliberate act of the party complained against.
Ahrenfeldt v. Ahrenfeldt, i Hoff. Ch. 47 (N. Y.). The abandonment must
be shown to be without the fault of the plaintiff and that the defendant
was in fault in not resuming the marriage relation. Smithson v. Smithson,
18 D. C. 356. So an absence of three years was held not to be a desertion
in the legal sense in Rogers v. Rogers, 18 N. J. Eq. 445, under the circum-
stances.
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ELECTRICITY-RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS-MISTAKE OF FACT-ARMouR PACK-
ING COMPANY V. EDISON ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. OF BROOKLYN, i00 N. Y.
Supp. 605.-Held, that where the customer of an electric company, who was
unaware of the discrimination, paid the company in excess of that charged
others for the same service and under the same circumstances, the payment
was under a mistake of a material fact and the excess was recoverable.
The general rule is that a payment made by mistake of fact may be recov-
ered, Rutherford v. Mclxor, 21 Ala. 75o. Lack of consideration is the true
ground of the recovery. Little v. Derby, 7 Mich. 325. Knowledge of the
facts, which disentitles the party from recovery must mean a knowledge
existing at the time of payment. Kelley v. Solari, 9 Mees. and Wels, 54. It
is no defense to an action to recover such money that the other party had
the means of knowledge, but if money be paid in ignorance of a fact, which
would have absolved the party paying it in law but not in morals and con-
science, it would seem that there is not sufficient ground for recovery.
Story on Contracts, Par. 422. There are minority dicta to the effect that only
if the money be paid in ignorance of a material fact and without reasonable
means of ascertaining it, is it recoverable, Peterborough v. Lancaster, 14
N. H. 382.
EMINENT DOMAIN-ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-
RAUCK V. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, III N. W. (IowA) io27.-Held, that in a
proceeding to condemn land for a public use, the true measure of damages
is the value of the property as a whole in the condition it was in at the date
of the condemnation. Deemer and Ladd, JJ., dissenting.
In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the
same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between
private parties. Boon Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 4o3. The value of the land
taken is to be estimated irrespective of the benefit resulting to it from the
proposed improvement, Cobb v. Boston, 112 Mass. 183, and a fortiori the
estimate should be irrespective of the benefit resulting to adjacent lands.
San Diego T. & L. Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63. Some of the cases seem to lose
the distinction between advanced prices caused by reason of the fact that the
improvement was to be constructed and work done thereon, and advanced
prices caused by the possible increase of value thereafter by reason of the
prospective improvements having been constructed in that vicinity. Sani-
tary Dist. v. Langbran, 16o Ill. 362. It is the value at the time of taking, and
not the value after the improvement is made, which should be considered.
Mills on Eminent Domain, section 174; Burt v. Wigglesworth, 117 Mass. 302.
EVIDENCE-ExPERT TESTIMONY.-UNDERWOOD v. A. W. STEVENS CO., 112
N. W. 487 (MIcH.).-Held, in an action for the burning of plaintiff's building
by the operation of a traction engine by defendant's agents without a spark-
arrester and with the damper open, it was proper to allow competent engi-
neer to express an opinion as to whether the running of the engine past
buildings with the damper open and no spark-arrester was a proper operation
of the engine.
The rule is, that the opinion of experts as skilled witnesses is admis-
sible in evidence in these cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that
inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct
judgment upon it, for the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of
the nature of a science, art or trade, as to require a previous habit, or experi-
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ence, or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it. Rogers on Expert
Testimony, page i7". The opinion of witnesses cannot be received when the
inquiry is in relation to a subject-matter, the nature of which is such as not
to require any peculiar habits of study in order to qualify a man to under-
stand it. Smith Leading Cases, 286. In Teall v. Barton, 40 Barb. (N. Y.)
137, the defendants were engaged in removing a sunken boat from the channel
of a canal by means of a steam dredging machine, in the vicinity of plaintiff's
farm-buildings, without any spark-arrester or screen upon their smoke-
stack. A question to a witness as to whether he considered it dangerour to
use the dredge without a spark-arrester was properly overruled, as it was
no question of science or unusual skill and, therefore, did not fall within the
rule relating to expert testimony. An expert cannot testify as to what con-
stitutes an engine properly constructed in the matter of a spark-arrester, but
after a certain appliance has been identified as being ordinarily employed, a
witness may state, as the result of his own experience, that cinders shown
to him could not be emitted through such an appliance if an engine were
properly constructed. Brush v. Long Island R. R. Co., Io Me. Div. 535
(affirmed 158 N. Y. 742). Defendant called witnesses long connected with
the fire department of Portland to whom he presented a plan of the buildings,
their construction, material, etc., and asked whether or not in their opinion
large fires in large wooden buildings make their own currents, frequently
eddying against the winds. This testimony was excluded. State v. Watson,
65 Maine 74. The application of the general rule will be seen from the
illustration in the cases similar to the principal case.
LARCENY-PRPERTY LOST.-STATE v. LEVINE, 66 AnL. 529 (CoNN.)-Held,
that where the finder of a bank check handed the same to defendant, inquir-
ing whether he knew the owner, and the defendant to induce the finder to
leave the check with him that he might convert it to his own use, falsely
represented that he expected the owner to call at his store, and that he
would give it to him, and upon its being left, converted it to his own use,
he was guilty of larceny.
It has been held that in order to constitute larceny, the intent to steal
must exist at the time of taking and it is not sufficient that he have the
intent at the time of conversion. People v. Wilson, 39 N. Y. 459. The pre-
vailing rule, however, is to the contrary. 12 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law. 772.
So where one has obtained possession lawfully, it must have been gotten
by false pretexts or fraud. Hermandez v. State, 20 Tex. App. 151. Or
there must be some new and distinct act of taking without intent to convert
to the use of the taker. Wharton Crim. Law, Vol. II, p. 437. In Tennessee
it is held that lost property, as distinguished from mislaid, cannot be the
subject of larceny; Lawrence v. State, 2o Tenn. 228; but the contrary view
is generally taken. Comm. v. Tanner, 14 Grat. 635 (Va.).
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-REGULATIONS-STATUTORY PROVISIONS-SUNDAY
CL0SIN.-PEoPr v. HENZE, 112 N. W. (MIcH.) 491. A statute provides that
all saloons be closed on Sunday, and declared that the word "closed" be con-
strued to apply to the back door or other entrance as well as to the front
door. Defeindant lived in a room above his saloon, which was reached
only by an outside stairway. No liquors were ever served in this room.-
Held, that where the defendant went to his saloon on Sunday.to gethis
meals in the kitchen at the rear, and to attend to the fires and empty the
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pans under the refrigerator, and admitted no other person, the saloon was
not closed within the meaning of the statute.
This would seem to be following the general rule, though perhaps unfair
on its face. The offense which the statute contemplates is the keeping
open of a saloon on the Sabbath day. The object of the legislature was to
remove all temptations from idle and dissolute persons who might be dis-
posed to congregate at such places, and violate the Sabbath by any improper
conduct. The law presumes an injury to the public by keeping open
the doors of a saloon on the Sabbath day, or why prohibit it? The offense is
complete under the law when it is established that the defendant has kept
open a saloon on that day, without further proof of injury to individuals or
the neighborhood. Hall v. State, 3 Ga. (Kelly) I8. A tippling house may be
kept open night or day during the week, but on the Sabbath day the law
says that it must be closed, absolutely closed, the front, sides and rear.
It makes no difference as to whether any liquors be sold or not, the offense
consists in its being open, not in selling or offering to sell, or giving it away.
Harvey v. Harvey, 65 Ga. 568. Some states, however, look more to the spirit
of the law, and it has been held that merely keeping open the doors of a tip-
pling-house on Sunday is not an offense within the statute, forbidding such
house to be kept open on Sunday, Potter v. City of Centralia, 47 Ill. 370.
And see, Krorer v. People, 78 Ill. 284; Koop v. The People, 47 Ill. 327. In
State v. Gregory, 47 Conn. 276, a charge that "if the room was ordinarily
used for any other purpose of business, no matter what, it must be
closed between those hours" (twelve o'clock Saturday night to twelve o'clock
on Sunday night) no matter what other ordinary business it might be de-
sired to carry on there, was held clearly contrary to the spirit of the law,
and therefore erroneous.
LiBFL-WoRos LIBELOus PER SE.-NEW YORK BUREAU OF INFORMATION
v. RIDGWAY-THAYER CO., ET AL., 104 N. Y. SUPP. 202. An article, entitled
"Bucket Shop Sharks," reading: "One of M.'s most intimate friends and
active lieutenants is K., founder of the New York Bureau of Information,
now managed by his brother, K. K. is a tout, sleek enough in his methods
to have corralled bankers and brokers of unimpeachable legitimacy as clients
for the New York Bureau of Information. His portrait, until it was sur-
reptitiously removed, was No. 295-G, in the Chicago Rogues' Gallery, and he
has the distinction of having served a penal sentence for the larceny of goods
from such masters of merchantry as Levi Z. Leiter and Marshall Field'-
was libelous per se as to the New York Bureau of Information, whether the
statements in regard to K. referred to the founder of the bureau or to his
brother. Ingraham and Scott, JJ., dissenting.
MASTER AND SERVAT-FLLOw SERVANTS.-PAYNE V. GEORGETOWN Lum-
DER Co., 42 So. 475 (LA.).-Held, that employees in a saw-mill who are
not co-associated in the same work are not fellow servants.
This decision reaffirms Merritt v. Victoria Lumber Co., III La. 159, but
is contrary to the general rule as to who are fellow servants; i. e., all serving
a common master and engaged in the same general business, although in
different departments. Cooley on Torts [3rd Ed.], 1071. In England the
rule extends to every member of an establishment. Abraham v. Reynolds,
5 H. & N. 143. In Massachusetts, Shaw, C. J., early held that an engineer
could not recover for an injury in consequence of the negligence of a switch-
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man. Nicholas Fa-well v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 4 Met. 59; and later
cases declared a carpenter and a switchman, a laborer and trainmen, fellow
servants. Gilman v. Eastern R. R. Co., IO Allen 233; Gilshannon v. Stony
Brook R. R., io Cush. 228. And in Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa.
432, it was said not to be essential that workmen should be engaged in the
same particular work to be fellow servants. But contra to the rule, in
Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 IIl. 391, a laborer and an engine
driver were held not to be fellow servants; and so as to a section man and
a foreman, Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Erickson, 41 Neb. I. In Ohio a con-
ductor and an engineer were declared not to be fellow servants. Little
Miami R. R. Co. v. Stevens, 2o Ohio 415; and the same conclusion was
reached in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377,
but under strong dissent.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-AssuMPTION OF RISK.-
LYoN V. CHARLESTON & W. C. Ry., 58 S. E. 13 (S. C.)-Held, where a flag-
man injured while uncoupling cars under the order of the conductor, which
duty was within his employment, he assumed the risk. Gary, A. J., dis-
senting.
An employee cannot recover for an injury resulting from one of the
usual risks or hazards connedted with the business into which he has entered,
and which the law will consider he assumed when undertaking the duties
of the position. Woodworth v. St. Paul M. & M. R. R. Co. (C. C.) 18 Fed.
282. This rule is practically settled in the U. S. But he may contract to the
contrary, Foster v. Pussey, 14 Atl. 545. A railroad brakeman assumes 'all
the ordinary risks of the employment, Chicago R. L & P. Ry. Co. v. Clark,
1o8 Ill. 113, but where a master coerces a servant into entering a dangerous
employment the servant does not assume the risk, Wells & French Co. v.
Gortorski, 50 Ill. App. 445. Again, the master may, if he chooses, carry on
his business with an old machine rather than a new one, and a threat to
discharge a servant unless he will perform the stipulated service, is not
coercion, Sweeny v. Berlin & Jones Envelope Co., IOI N. Y. 520. The dis-
senting opinion on the main case is a very strong one and he bases his opin-
ion on the fact that the distinction between contributory negligence and
assumption of risk is not a very shadowy one as the U. S. Supreme Court
laid down in Schlemmer v. Railroad, 27 Sup. Ct. 4o7, but distinct and clear.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO THIRD PmRSONS-LIABILITY OF MAS-
TER-SAVANNAH ELECTRIC Co. v. WHEELER, ET AL., 58 S. E. 38 (GA.).-Held,
that allegations that the company knowingly placed in charge of one of its
passenger cars a conductor of bad character, who was drunk and armed
with a pistol, and that a homicide occurred in the manner indicated in the
preceding note, were not demurrable.
NEGLIGENCE-IMPUTED NEGLIGENE.-DOcTOROFF V. METROPOLITAN ST. Ry.
Co., iO5 N. Y. SuP. 229.-Held, that where the servant was riding on a truck,
driven by his master at the time of the servant's injury in a collision between
the truck and one of defendant's street cars, the negligence of the master, if
any, was not imputable to the servant.
In general the concurrent negligence of third parties is no defense.
Getty v. Consolidated Gas Co., 96 Md. 683. But in the case of public 
con-
veyances in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, it was said that the plaintiff
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being a passenger voluntarily, -was so far identified with the carriage that
want of care on the part of the driver would bar plaintiff's action. And
this doctrine has been followed in some of the states. See Lockhart v.
Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. St. I51. But has been overruled in England, The
Bernina, L. R., 12 Prob. Div. 58; and repudiated by the United States
Supreme Court, Little v. Hackett, 1i6 U. S. 366; the weight of authority
being strongly against it. Eaton v. Boston, etc., R. Co., ii Allen (Mass.)
5o. And as to private conveyances, Doctoroff v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.,
supra, is in harmony with the general trend of the more recent decisions.
Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.), 1473; Hoag v. N. Y. Cent., etc., R. Co., InI
N. Y. i99. But if the driver is under plaintiff's control, his negligence is
imputable. Read v. City and Suburban Ry. Co., 115 Ga. 366. Or if two are
engaged in a joint enterprise and each has an equal right to direct movement
of the vehicle. Boyden v. Fitchburg R. Co., 72 Vt. 89. However, in Lake
Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274, it was held that the contributory
negligence of a master is imputable to servant; and of a husband to wife in
G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vi. Greenlee, 62. Tex. 344. And the doctrine of Thoro-
good v. Bryan, supra, is approved as to private conveyances in Prideaux v.
City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513.
NEGLIGENCE-IMPUTF NEGLIGENCE-PARENT AND CHILD.-ATCHIsON, T.
& S. F. RY. Co. v. CALuouN, 89 PAc. 207 (Oxn.)-Held, that in an action
by an infant of tender years, in its own right, for personal injuries arising
from negligence of a railway company, the fault or negligence of its mother
or a third party, if any, contributing to such injury, cannot be imputed to
the child.
In this country much conflict exists in the law on this subject In Eng-
land, the negligence of the custodian is imputed to the infant and recovery
is denied. Waite v. Northeast R. Co., El. Bl. & El., 719; Singleton v. East-
ern Counties R. Co., 7 C. B. (N. S.) 287. In the United States the leading
case in harmony with the English rule is Hartfielder v. Roper, 21 Wend.
(N. Y.) 615, where it was held that a child of two years who was run over
while playing in the public street, was not entitled to recover for the negli-
gent injury, because of the negligence of the parents in thus exposing him to
injury. This case has been followed in several states: Casey v. Smith, 152
Mass. 294; Cumberland v. Lottig, 95 Md. 42; Leslie v. Lewiston, 62 Me. 468.
But in at least twenty-three states its doctrine has been repudiated: inter
alia, see Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213; Erie Pass. Ry. Co. v. Schuster, 113
Pa. St. 412; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 138 Ill. 370. In a suit by the
parent in his own behalf for an injury to the child, the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence is a defense. Williams v. Texas, etc., Co., 6o Tex. 205;
Tucker v. Draper, 62 Neb. 66. But the negligence of one parent will not
defeat the action of another. Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369;
contra, Toner v. South Covington, etc., St. Ry. Co., log Ky. 41.
PARTITION-ScoPE OF INQUIRY.-RoLB v. Evxamv, 65 ATL. (N. J.)
732.-Held, that in a suit for partition the court would not determine the
validity of a tax title asserted by defendant, but would hold the case to await
the decision of a court of law as to the validity of such title.
Bills for partition of land must allege a seisin in possession in both
complainant and defendant. Culver v. Culver, 2 Root (Conn.) 278. Bolin
v. Jacquelin, 22 N. Y. Supp. 193. At common law neither title nor right to
YALE LAW IOURNAL
possession could be determined in an action for partition, Cave v. Holford, 3
Ves. Jr. 656; Nichols v. Nichols, 28 Vt 228; and if the question of title be
purely legal, in absence of statute, a court of equity will relegate the party to
his remedy at law, Pierce v. Rollins, 83 Me. 172, either dismissing the bill,
Riverview Cemetery Co. v. Turner, 24 N. J. Eq. i8, or, ex gratia, for a rea-
sonable time, Nost v. Simpson, 78 Me. 142, stay proceedings until com-
plainant establishes his title at law, Fenton v. Steere, 76 Mich. 4o5; Hardy
v. Mills, 35 Wis. 141 ;*Chapin v. Sears, i8 Fed. 814.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-FRAUD OF AGENT-ScoPE OF EMPLOYMENT-L)A-
BILITY OF PRINCIPAL.-WILMERDING ET AL. V. POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE Co.,io3
N. Y. Supp. 594.-Held, that, where the messenger of a telegraph company,
authorized to present memorandum slips of telegrams sent, and receive pay-
ment of the charges due thereon, presented a customer fictitious memoran-
dum slips, which were paid by him and the money retained by the messenger,
the telegraph company was liable to the customer for the money so paid,
though the customer had a letter-press copybook of telegrams, and could
have ascertained that he was being defrauded by a comparison of it with the
memorandum slips presented. Laughlin and Scott, JJ., dissenting.
By the weight of authority the principal is liable for the misconduct of
his agent in the apparent scope of his authority, Huntley v. Mathias, 9 N. C.
• ioi; McCord v. W. U. T. Co., 39 Minn. 18i. Having once clothed him with
the power to perform certain acts, the principal is responsible for the wrongs
committed in that kind of work, Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117; Bank of
Batavia v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., io6 N. Y. 195. And his responsibility
is based on the fact that he has put it within the power of the agent to
defraud innocent third persons. Tootme v. Parkersburg Branch R., 39 Md. 36.
But the doctrine is subject to the qualification that the third person must act
in good faith, Allen v. So. Boston R., i5o Mass. 2oo, and prudently, Farring-
ton v. Same, I5o Mass. 4o6. The fact that the third person by the exercise
of proper diligence might have avoided the error is no defense. Union Na-
tional Bank v. Sixth National Bank, 43 N. Y. 455. Customers have a right
to assume that the agent is honest and are not required to particularly in-
spect for the purpose of discovering fraud. Birkett v. Postal Telegraph Co.,
94 N. Y. Supp. 918.
RAILROADS- CoNsTRucTIoN- OBsTRucrIoN OF VIEW- NEGLIGENCE.-
CowLEs v. NEW YoRx, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 66 Am. 1020 (CoN.).-Held, the
mere neglect of a railroad company to cut down trees on its right of way
in the vicinity of a grade crossing is not in itself actionable negligence in the
absence of any statute requiring it to keep its right of way free from unnec-
essary obstructions to a view of the tracks by persons using an adjacent
highway, although it may be considered with other circumstances in deter-
mining whether the company exercised care in the operation of its car at a
particular time.
RAPE-EVIDENCE-COMPLAINT OF FEmALE.-PEOPLE v. BIANCHINO, 91 PAc.
112 (CAL.). In a prosecution for rape of a five-year old girl, committed
toward the latter part of January, it appeared that the prosecutrix was
examined on the 5th of February by a physician, who, a few days later dis-
covered that prosecutrix was infected with a venereal disease.-Held, that
evidence of complaints of the injury made by prosecutrix shortly before and
after February 5th was admissible.
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On a trial for rape, evidence of the woman's complaints, made shortly
afterwards, is inadmissible, People v. Tierney, 67 Cal. 54. This case would
seem to be in conflict with the decision in the main case. On trial for rape
the prosecution may show, by the testimony of the prosecuting witness, or that
of other witnesses, that she made complaint of the outrage, recently after its
commission, and when, where, and to whom it was made, Thompson v.
State, 38 Ind. 39. Evidence that prosecutrix made complaint soon after the
injury is admissible to corroborate her testimony, Stato v. Mitchell, 68 Iowa
ii6; State v. Warner, 74 Mo. 83.
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-FooD--WHoLESOMENESS.-ToMLINSON V.
ARMOUR & Co., 65 ATL. (N. J.) 883.-Held, that at common law on a sale
of food articles to a dealer in provisions there was no implied warranty of
wholesomeness. Assuming that a different rule exists in the case of a sale
by such dealer to a consumer, the latter in the absence of statutes cannot
hold the original vendor to a higher degree of duty than that cast upon him
by the common law with respect to his own vendee.
At common law as between dealers in provisions there was no implied
warranty as to fitness, Ryder v. Neitge, 21 Minn. 7o; Moses v. Mead, 43 Am.
Dec. (N. Y.) 676, and although in 3 Blackstone 166, the doctrine was that
as between dealer and consumer there was an implied warranty, it was
expressly overruled in Enverton & Marthen, 7 Hurlst & N. 586, and Burnby
v. Bollett, 6 M. & W. 644; but the American rule is that the mere offer of
provisions to consumers is of itself a warranty of their fitness for consump-
tion as such. Cooley on Torts (3rd Edition) Vol. 2, page 914; Wiederman
v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93; Croft v. Parker, 96 Mich. 245; making it an exception
to the general rule of the common law and to the maxim of caveat emptor,
Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552; Winsor v. Lombard, i8 Pick. (Mass.) 57,
and bringing it within the scope of the civil law rule, caveat venditor, Howard
& Hoey, 35 A. P. (N. Y.) 572.
STXTUTES-IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS-STRICT CONSTRUCTION.-PEET V.
CrrY OF EAST GRAND FORKS, 112 N. W. 1005 (MINN.).-Held, that statutes
affecting vested rights acquired under existing laws, imposing new duties
or creating obligati6ns where otherwise none existed, should, if valid at all,
be construed strictly, and treated as embracing only such matters as come
clearly within the scope and purpose of the legislation. Jaggard, J., dis-
senting.
A close construction should be given to statutes which work forfeit-
tures or confiscations of property; at the same time, full effect should be
allowed to the legislative will. U. S. v. Athens' Armory, 35 Ga. 344. Stat-
utes in derogation of the common law must be construed strictly. People
v. Buster, Ii Cal. 215. Words must be given their obvious and natural
meaning, if it is possible to do so without doing violence to the legislative
intent as gathered from the whole act. Wilson v. Biscoe, Ix Ark. 44.
TAXATIoN-ExEMPTIoNs-CHARrTABLE ISTITUTioNS.-lO3 S. W. (Ky.)
354.-Held, that a corporation, whose sole object is to provide a suitable
home for the destitute widows and orphans of deceased members of a certain
secret society of the state, is an "institution of purely public charity," -within
the meaning of Const, section 17o, and its property is exempt from taxation.
Hobson & Nunn, JJ., dissenting.
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TELEGRAPHS-DAMAGES FOR MENTAL SUFFERING.-ARKANSAS & L. Ry. Co.
V. STROUDE, 100 S. W. 76o (ARx.).-Held, that in an action for mental suffer-
ing alleged to be due to defendant's failure to deliver a telegram to plain-
tiff, the court properly instructed the jury that, in fixing the amount of
plaintiff's damages, they should take into consideration his grief and mental
suffering caused by defendant's negligence.
The general rule that mental anguish and suffering, resulting from
mere negligence, unaccompanied with injuries to the person, cannot be made
the basis of an action for damages, has come down from English courts.
Lynch v. Knight, 2 H. L. Cas. 577; Hobbs v. Railroad Co., L. R., io Q. P.
122. In the United States the question has arisen frequently in such actions
against telegraph companies; the decided weight of authority denying recov-
ery. Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) 92. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fergu-
son, 157 Ind. 64, it was said that there is no open and practicable means by
which such damages can be assessed; that the defendant's hands were tied.
Other courts have also declared the damage too vague: Stansell v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 1O7 Fed. 668; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hatton, 71 Ill. App.
63. But in 1881, in Texas a right of recovery was asserted: So. Relle v.
Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 3o8. This decision has been followed in at least four
other states: see, Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Ia. 752; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Steenberger, 107 Ky. 469; Bryan v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 133 N. C. 6o3; Newport News, etc., R. Co. v. Griffin, 92 Tenn. 692. In
Alabama recovery is allowed if the action is ex contractu. Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Kirchbaum, 132 Ala. 538. In Arkansas the right of recovery is
based on statute. Kirby's Dig., section 7947.
TELEGRAPis-DELAY IN DELIVERY-NoTICE OF DAMAGEs.-DEMPSEY V.
WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO., 58 S. E. 9 (S. C.).-Held, that it cannot be
said, as a matter of law, that on a failure of a telegraph company to deliver
a telegram "Will be to Perry on morning train; meet me there"-resulting
exposure and sickness could not have been anticipated.
TELEGRAPHs-TRANsMIssION OF MESSAGES.-HALSTED V. POSTAL TELE-
GRAPH CABLE Co., 104 N. Y. SupP. ioi6.-Held, that where plaintiff wrote
defendant, asking for quotations on certain goods by telegraph, and the
message, which was an unrepeated one, was sent to plaintiff on a blank ex-
empting the telegraph company from liability for mistakes in an unrepeated
message, plaintiff was not entitled to recover in an action in tort for damages
arising from a mistake in the message. Gaynor and Hooker, JJ., dissenting.
In England, Dickson v. Rentee's Telegraph Co., 3 C. P. D. i, lays down
the rule that no action will lie by the receiver of a telegraphic message for
a mistake in message delivery. Almost without exception, the contrary is
held in the United States. Vide, Pearsall v. Western U. Tel. Co., 124 N. Y.
256; Rittenhouse v. Independent Line of Telegraph, 44 N. Y. 263. And a
stipulation by company that it shall not be responsible for errors is void as
an attempt to relieve itself of the consequences of its own fault. Cooley on
Torts, (3d Ed.) 1485. Not so in most jurisdictions, however, if accompa-
nied with provision requiring message to be repeated. See leading case,
Ellis v. American Tel. Co., 13 Allen (Mass.) 226; contra, as against public
policy, Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493; Tyler v. Western U.
Tel. Co., 74 Ill. 168. And the agency doctrine of ratification has in some
jurisdictions been relied upon to defeat recovery by a receiver where condi-
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tions have been held valid, e. g., Aiken v. Western U. Tel. Co., 5 S. C. 358;
in others, as in Ellis v. American Tel. Co., supra, receiver has been treated
as impliedly assenting to contract of which the conditions were integral part.
But in many other states the receiver's remedy lies in tort, New York, etc.,
Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298; Webbe v. Western U. Tel. Co., 169 Ill. 6io;
and this is the general rule, Crosswell on the Law Relating to Electricity, s.
47r, 472, in harmony with which the dissenting opinion of Halsted v. Postal
Tel. Co., supra, was rendered. See also, Thompson on the Law of Elec-
tricity, S. 427-430.
WILLS-HoLOGRAPHIC WILLS-CONSTRUCrION.-CARROLL v. ADAMS, ET AL.,
Io5 N. Y. SupP. 967.-Held, where testatrix executed a holographic will, by
which she divided her estate into three parts and gave the first to the chil-
dren of her sister A, deceased, and the second to her sister D, deceased, the
bequest of the second share did not fail because D was dead at the time the
will was made, but such share passed to D's children.
